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Development vs. Environment in Taibei 
Simona Alba GRANO and TU Ping-Lan 
Abstract: Although Taiwan arguably needs civil and official collabora-
tion on environmental protection, the implementation of an efficient 
system of environmental regulations has often been hindered by the 
many actors involved in the process of environmental governance (state, 
economic actors, civil society, media), whose interests are divergent. 
Consequently, there is no uniform, homogeneous authority for environ-
mental governance but rather a variety of official and less official agents 
of authority whose interests and powers overlap and compete. In this 
paper we will introduce a case study dealing with the controversy sur-
rounding the construction of an alternative road connecting Danshui (␑
≤) with Taibei City (namely, the Danshui North Shore Road Project, ␑
े䚃䐟, Danbei daolu) to elucidate what the key influences are that govern 
environmental power dynamics between different agents with conflicting 
(or, sometimes, colluding) interests and how these multiple levels of 
interaction are negotiated by the various players. Our hypothesis holds 
that although environmental policies are, for the most part, mandated 
from the top, at the local level their implementation can be bypassed, 
altered or stalled by these various agents. 
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Introduction 
All Taiwanese political parties prioritize economic growth over environ-
mental protection. The two main parties on the political scene use the 
environment as a tool to attack each other, the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) (≁ѫ䘋↕ފ, Minzhu Jinbudang) claiming that the Kuomin-
tang (KMT) (ഭ≁ފ, Guomindang) is irresponsible in its pro-growth 
stance, and the KMT maintaining that the DPP is anti-business. How-
ever, Taiwan is also a place where regulators and city officials have at-
tempted to redress certain imbalances in the ecological environment by 
enacting a series of programmes aimed at the creation of a green, sus-
tainable economy and a recycling-oriented society (Her 2010: 4-12). 
While environmentalists gained access to policy decision-making af-
ter the democratization process started in 1987, pro-development groups 
have also increased their power since then, and government policies have 
consequently shifted back to a more pro-business position. As argued by 
Ho, this paradox is the result of a decreasing state capacity, which em-
powered environmentalists but at the same time could not resist busi-
nesses’ lobbying (Ho 2005). While Taiwan is praised by some scholars 
for being a brilliant example of a country that has enjoyed a smooth 
transition to democratization, an analysis of its green politics will show 
how democratization, by empowering agents that previously lacked pow-
er, has created both opportunities and obstacles for those groups whose 
interests lie with environmental protection (Tang 1999: 351). 
The numerous “stakeholders” participating in the environmental 
governance process have been the focus of public policy research but 
have seldom been studied in terms of their political influence and their 
ability to influence the implementation of green policies. Our unit of 
analysis centres on social and political interactions among various actors 
in regards to a controversial developmental project, the Danshui North 
Shore Road Project (␑े䚃䐟, Danbei daolu). We are interested in dis-
covering who the most effective actors were in the Danshui case. Did 
social groups make a difference, or did the ultimate decisions lay primari-
ly with other, more “legitimate” actors? We furthermore elaborate on 
what kinds of methods were used: official ones (which implies making 
use of the available legal tools) or unofficial ones (for example, street 
protests or, in the case of local governments, bribery by the construction 
companies)? 
The methodology employed for this research was inspired by that 
used in similar projects in other parts of the world, and it hinges pre-
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dominantly on extensive interviews (informal, unstructured interviewing 
and semi-structured interviewing) with NGO activists, local residents 
and related local institutions, as well as on a review of relevant literature. 
Field research for this study was conducted in Taibei City and Danshui 
from February to June 2011. Follow-up interviews were conducted in 
September and October of the same year. All the civil society organiza-
tions interviewed are grass-roots NGOs except for one, which is spon-
sored by the local Danshui government (namely, the Danshui Heritage 
Foundation). Among the grass-roots organizations we interviewed, we 
have chosen to focus in this paper on two of the main NGOs involved 
in the controversy, the Green Citizens’ Action Alliance (㔯㢢ޜ≁㹼ࣘ㚄
ⴏ, Lüse gongmin xingdong lianmeng) and the Society for the Protection of 
Wilderness (㦂䟾؍ᣔॿՊ, Huangye baohu xiehui). Moreover, we carried 
out multiple interviews with the local Danshui representative of the 
Green Party of Taiwan (㔯ފ Lü dang), with two scholars who have a 
personal vested interest in Danshui, and with other environmentalists 
who have in-depth knowledge of this case. Though the two NGOs were 
interviewed in March, when the results of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA, ⧟ຳᖡ૽䇴ՠࡦᓖ , Huanjing yingxiang pinggu zhidu) 
were still unknown, Green Party representatives and local residents were 
interviewed in April and May, when the final decision to go ahead with 
the construction project had already been made public. Follow-up inter-
views with other members of those same NGOs were carried out in the 
fall. Participant observation methods were also employed in that same 
period: One of the authors actively participated in all of the activities 
(from the organizational start-up phase to the actual street protest) orga-
nized by the Green Party of Taiwan and co-sponsored by the Green 
Citizens’ Action Alliance to fight the road-building project. This study is 
based on ethnographic data, as well as newspaper articles, data collected 
from various websites, environmental reports, NGO newsletters, and 
documents provided by social organizations, governmental agencies and 






 124 Simona Alba Grano and Tu Ping-Lan 
Theoretical Foundations 
Local Governance
Local politics in Taiwan feature characteristics of both pro-growth urban 
regimes of Western democracies and patron-client networks typical of 
authoritarian regimes. Such features have rendered local politics resistant 
to democratic reforms. While at the central level competitive elections 
were introduced decades ago, urban policies are still dominated by a 
minority of powerful elites, and the interests of disadvantaged groups 
have remained largely under-represented. Tang argues that numerous 
cases of anti-growth politics in numerous localities indicate the possibil-
ity that, as of recently, democracy is slowly reaching the local level, 
thereby shifting local politics away from a sheer interest in revenue-
seeking activities toward a civic activism whose main concerns are social 
and environmental (Tang 2003: 1029). Such a theory leads us to consider 
local authorities as unitary wholes sharing the same set of interests. As 
we will see in the Danshui case, though, different governmental bureaus 
and agencies often have different agendas and try to circumnavigate each 
other, which has led some scholars to use the expression “iron triangle”  
(䫱й䀂, tie sanjiao) when referring to the interest ties between the ruling 
party (㈏㓧ފ, zhizheng dang), local factions, and business conglomerates 
in Taiwan at the expense of the environment and the public interest 
(Jobin 2010: 56; Hsu 2003: 459; Kuo 2000). Such was the case in the 
controversy over building a cable car in Yangmingshan National Park (䱣
᰾ኡഭᇦޜഝ, Yangmingshan guojia gongyuan), north of Taibei. In that case, 
the Taibei City government tried more than once to bypass the legal 
requirements of an EIA and circumnavigated the Taiwan Environmental 
Protection Administration’s control (Su 2006: 2). The same is true for 
the case study in this article where, as we will see, two local governments 
with differing interests tried to overcome each other and to evade the 
EPA’s control through various means. Hsu argues that in the case of 
watershed management, for example, democratization has had a negative 
effect due to the exaggerated influence of this iron triangle in the policy 
process. In reality, the problem lies in the explicit support that is being 
given, often without prior EIAs, to controversial projects, thus making 
widespread corruption and the pursuit of economic interests the two 
main culprits. It has to be noted that in Taiwan the situation has increas-
ingly improved since the landmark case of the Hsiangshan Tidal Flat 
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Development Project in Hsinchu (1992–2001), in which an EIA for the 
first time managed to prevent the realization of a highly damaging devel-
opmental project. In that particular case, also for the first time, a scientif-
ically based discussion by scholars, academics and activists substituted 
previous emotional environmental protests (Tang 2003). 
The overlapping competencies and increasingly complicated net-
works of governance that have arisen in the environmental realm in Tai-
wan are also visible at the global level. In Khagram and Ali’s words,  
A more complex political economy is emerging globally in which the 
actors of governance stretch beyond the confines of states to where 
governmental, civil society and private sector actors form functional 
coalitions and broad horizontal networks, and the institutions of gov-
ernance include not only international laws and treaties, but also the 
use of norms, codes, and voluntary standards (Khagram and Ali 2008: 
133).  
While classic policy studies tend to focus on institutional actors (gov-
ernments and states) and their politics because these are the most au-
thoritative figures – those with the capability of turning policies into 
actions and regulations – lately, scholars have started to consider another 
angle, one that gives high importance to personal and ideological politics 
and that falls into the category of critical policy studies. In doing so, they 
take into consideration how values, opinions and ideas are shaped by the 
policymaking discourse and how these, in turn, shape the policymaking 
process (Whitman 2008: 163).  
The non-state sector is one of the most active players that has re-
cently emerged in governance (Zheng and Fewsmith 2008), capable of 
influencing the policymaking process and the implementation of regula-
tions at the local level.  
Political Patronage 
Tang Ching-ping and Tang Shui-yan demonstrated in one of their art-
icles how the ruling party, in order to be successful in a confrontation 
with environmentalists, needs to have a strong political network at the 
local level, where patron–client ties are thicker and can be exploited 
when needed (Tang and Tang 1997: 293). This interaction between na-
tional and local political processes is directly related to a deeper under-
standing of the democratization process. As argued by Diamond, “de-
mocratization inevitably proceeds unevenly, and authoritarian enclaves 
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persist most stubbornly at the local or provincial level” (Diamond 1999: 
244). Local politics are also more easily subjected to patron–client net-
works, which follow private interests and promote favouritism rather 
than transparency or accountability. Thus, public projects often become 
private, rent-seeking activities rather than being created for the public 
good. While in “young democracies” central-level politicians are usually 
committed to democratic principles (if for no better reason than simply 
because of their public profile), at the local level government officials 
still maintain patronage networks with their supporters, involving the 
employment of material gifts and favouritism (Tang 2003: 1030). 
When public expenditure issues are debated, citizens become in-
volved in this equation as well, joining with concerned environmentalists 
and social groups in demanding to know how and why public money is 
being spent on potentially environmentally damaging projects (Ho 2006). 
The following question thus arises: Which actors are the most influential 
and how do they manage to gain support for their cause?  
A Heterarchy of Powers 
Coming from a political science perspective, we believe that concepts 
like “state” and “local government” are not to be taken as unitary wholes 
situated on the top or bottom of the power scale. In our case study, the 
anthropological concept of heterarchy, which defines hierarchy as com-
plicated, fragmented, and influenced by various agents whose power 
varies with time, is a better theoretical starting point than the concepts 
mentioned in the previous sentence.  
This article cites a case study in Taibei County and analyses the evo-
lution of local governance around a controversial road project with nu-
merous agents involved. While some actors try to reinforce and better 
represent the public interest, others are out for their own private gains, 
and still others attempt to safeguard the effectiveness of legal institu-
tions, such as the EIA, to name but one. Such a discrepancy of interests 
is quite normal considering that while central governments have to bal-
ance the country’s pursuit of energy supplies with the ensuing environ-
mental damages arising from hasty economic development, local gov-
ernments usually pay more attention to short-term economic growth 
issues. Under such circumstances, local and central interests in regards to 
the implementation of environmental policies differ. This conflict of 
interest between national regulations and local stakeholders has, in the 
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past few years, become influenced by new emerging powers and actors 
like social organizations, journalists, and local and national agencies.  
As we shall see, the Danshui North Shore Road Project comprises a 
mixture of successes and failures, the meeting of various levels of gov-
ernment, and the competing interests of the various actors. Even though 
the dichotomy of “green policies from above and countermeasures from 
below” (Weller 2006: 155) helps to explain some of these dynamics, its 
weakness is its oversimplification of the complex interactions between 
different agents into a “dyad”, positioning either people against the state, 
or local and central governments against each other. In the case of the 
Danshui Road, the situation is not unitary; there is no harmony between 
the two powerful actors (local and central government), nor is there any 
agreement, for that matter, among the people. With this article, we want 
to challenge the often-used binary distinction between “central” and 
“local” and show that it is too simplistic in its approach, as it does not 
take into consideration a variety of other actors, their economic and 
personal interests, and the overall changes in environmental behaviour 
that are mostly seen at the central level, where influences from abroad 
are felt more strongly (Weller 2006: 169). Rather than just accepting or 
rejecting the top-down view, we will try to show that environmental 
governance has developed into a heterarchy of conflicting nodes of 
powers at all levels.  
As explained by Weller, the most common anthropological response 
to the top-down model is the study of how local communities resist, 
rework or subvert these policies. While anthropology tends to consider 
the “state” a unified independent actor to be treated as a whole (in con-
trast to local communities, which are treated as fragmented and com-
plex), political science tends to do the opposite: It underscores distinc-
tions among the different levels of the state and their competing interests 
but ignores the differing interests among local communities, including 
their differences in both culture and levels of power (Weller 2006). In 
this article we try to challenge both of these views, showing that a com-
plex interaction of state and local communities at various levels does not 
allow us to employ a binary dyad of “central versus local”, because even 
within the same level of government we find differing behaviours among 
county and municipal environmental protection authorities and some-
times differing interests between the personnel of environmental bureaus 
and those of other bureaus. 
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The Growth Machine Theory 
Business elites have a strong personal financial incentive to maintain pro-
growth public policies and thus often seek alliances with local politicians 
who can facilitate their investments (Tang 2001). In turn, local polit-
icians, conditioned by the lack of resources to govern efficiently, seek 
alliances with those very same powerful business elites who can facilitate 
their rule. This vision of a city’s future to be developed according to the 
imaginations and desires of business and political elites has been defined 
as the theory of the “growth machine” (Molotch 1976, 1993). As ex-
plained by Clarence Stone in his study on Atlanta’s urban politics, since 
every local leader has to take into account the requests and interests of a 
varied and fragmented electorate, business elites, with wealth and re-
sources at their disposal, become an ideal partner for politicians, who can 
thus satisfy different stakeholders (Stone 1989: 3-12). Although the 
growth machine theory best applies to democratic political systems with 
free competitive elections, research that has applied this theory with 
various degrees of success to one-party authoritarian systems, such as 
China or Taiwan in the pre-reform period, does exist. Zhu Jieming, for 
example, applies the concepts of the growth machine and growth coali-
tion to China’s urban land reforms (Zhu 1999). Tang Ching-ping, in his 
study on the democratization of urban politics in Taiwan, claims that 
under one-party rule, prior to martial law being lifted, Taiwan fit the 
regime model well enough since even under such authoritarian and rigid 
constraints there were “frequent political successions through local elec-
tions” coupled with an overall continuity in pushing forward numerous 
pro-growth economic projects (Tang 2003: 1033).  
The Developmental State Theory 
These characteristics of Taiwan’s pro-growth regime allow us to intro-
duce another theory that fits our case study and that marks the differ-
ence between Taiwan’s pro-growth regime and its Western counterparts: 
the developmental state theory. As we will see in the Danshui case, the 
dominant role in this developmental project is played by a coalition of 
pro-growth politicians who will ultimately make the final decision to go 
ahead with this controversial road. It is no mystery that political elites are 
more successful at enforcing regulations and pushing forward their 
agendas in authoritarian contexts, where they can easily stifle dissent 
voiced by environmentalists or concerned citizens. At the local level, 
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politicians are often enmeshed in the economic environment by running 
private businesses and thus enjoying special privileges to participate in 
local developmental projects.  
The developmental state is usually conceptually positioned between 
two models: the state-planned economy model and the liberal economy 
model. Chalmers Johnson, in his book MITI and the Japanese Miracle, used 
the term “developmental state” in his analysis of Japan’s industrialization 
process. To paraphrase Johnson, the developmental state theory is a 
euphemism to describe the tight net of influences and contacts between 
political, bureaucratic and business actors that governs economic life in 
the capitalist states of Northeast Asia (Johnson 1982). 
To elaborate on the above arguments, this article first depicts the 
politics of road-building in northern Taiwan as it evolved into a protract-
ed contest between environmentalists, on one side, and a pro-develop-
ment faction of politicians and real estate developers on the other side. 
Second, by delineating and analysing the case of the Danshui North 
Shore Road Project, it shows how civic associations have been able to 
stall, for quite lengthy periods of time, the ultimate decisions of pro-
growth developers and traditional power elites by employing legal tools 
and measures such as the EIA.  
Our theoretical framework maintains that this case study represents 
a model of environmental governance in which there is no uniform atti-
tude toward the construction of the Taibei–Danshui road but rather a 
complex interaction of the state, local communities, and other actors. 
Rather than simply rejecting or adopting either the top-down or the bot-
tom-up view, we will try to show how road politics have evolved into a 
protracted and exhausting deadlock involving the use of environmental 
laws and personal ties to advance each faction’s goals. This environmen-
tal governance model has been influenced by numerous heterogeneous 
actors who gained conspicuous influence after the democratization pro-
cess began, toward the end of the 1980s. Authoritarian legacies are still 
present in local environmental governance, in the form of patronage and 
favouritism; nevertheless, other, previously powerless actors now play an 
important role as well. Thus, it is fair to say that Taiwanese environmen-
tal governance is, especially at the local levels, fragmented, inefficient and 
subjected to several debates that often prevent the best solution from 
being found. However, some harmony has been re-established by the 
EIA, which approved the controversial project. In this kind of environ-
mental governance model, the state (in our case, local) often attempts to 
 130 Simona Alba Grano and Tu Ping-Lan 
enhance its own power by entering into partnerships with commercial 
and other powerful actors lacking in an overt political function in order 
to increase the efficiency of environmental governance and seek support 
for its developmental projects, thereby solving protracted and common 
stalemates. 
The Danshui North Shore Road Project
Background Information 
The Danshui River runs alongside Guandu Natural Park (ޣ⑑㠚❦ޜഝ, 
Guandu ziran gongyuan). According to the historical records, the area was 
almost completely covered by water until at least the early Qing Dynasty. 
In Emperor Guangxu’s time (ݹ㐂ᑍ, Guangxu di 1871–1909), after the 
arrival of a few settlers, the area became farmland and remained so until 
1965. In 1968 the government constructed an embankment to prevent 
flooding, while farmlands outside the embankment were gradually aban-
doned. Due to its geographical location, near the mouth of the Danshui 
River, frequent tidal changes and the saline content of the water have 
transformed the location into a unique ecosystem, very suitable for man-
groves (㓒ṁ᷇, hongshulin), with a few heritage buildings and scenic areas. 
In the past decade, Danshui has become a popular attraction for daily 
visits from city slickers and families in search of a relaxing afternoon 
away from urban pollution. For these reasons, an increasing number of 
people have been going to Danshui for the weekend to enjoy its natural 
surroundings, and an increasing number of local residents have been 
commuting to Taibei every day for work. Danshui has also seen an in-
crease in the number of Taibei residents moving to the area for its scenic 
beauty and lower housing and rental costs. 
This incessant flow of people entering and exiting has increased the 
demand for additional transportation. At the moment there are two ways 
to travel between Taibei City (ਠेᐲ, Taibei Shi) and Danshui: the metro 
line and a highway, Route 2 (ਠҼ㓯, Tai er xian), which is increasingly 
prone to traffic jams at rush hours, a condition we had the opportunity 
to witness in person when, in February 2011, we observed the unending 
serpent of cars near the Guandu Bridge filled with visitors from Taibei 
City on their way to enjoy a sunny Saturday by the sea in Danshui, Taibei 
County (ਠे৯, Taibei Xian). With the real estate industry building more 
and more skyscrapers to attract newcomers to Danshui, the existing 
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means of transportation between the latter and Taibei City are becoming 
increasingly inadequate in preventing traffic jams. 
Proposed Alternatives 
Since 1996 numerous projects and proposals have been planned and 
discussed regarding solving the worsening traffic situation; due to the 
many agents and interests involved, they have all been either discarded or 
delayed until April 2011. On 15 April 2011 the committee responsible 
for carrying out the EIA (⧟ຳᖡ૽䇴ՠငઈՊ, Huanjing yingxiang pinggu 
weiyuanhui) authorized the construction of the controversial road. Envi-
ronmentalists have fought this project since 1996 out of concern for the 
ecological environment, which hosts a variety of rare species of birds and 
trees.  
The four alternatives proposed over these 15 years by the various 
agents involved have been:  
 the widening of Route 2;  
 the building of a highway along the north shore of the Danshui 
River;  
 the building of a surface road along the north shore of the river (on 
the riverbed); and  
 the building of a surface road along the north shore of the river (but 
not on the riverbed).  
All of these projects present problems and have encountered fierce op-
position; we discuss the problems and the opposition below.  
Widening of Route 2 
Initially, the most viable option seemed to be the widening of the already 
existing Route 2 (ਠҼ㓯ᤃኅ, Tai er xian tuozhan). However, this project 
was abandoned quite soon due to lack of funds. During the planning 
phase, Route 2 was designed to be 40 metres wide. Due to lack of sub-
sidies needed to purchase the necessary land, its width was then reduced 
to 25 metres. The widening plan soon ran out of money so the whole 
project was eventually discarded. 
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Highway along the North Shore of the Danshui River  
(1996–2000)
This second project (␑≤⋣ेڤ⋯⋣ᘛ䙏䚃䐟儈ᷦ, Danshuihe beice 
yanhe kuaisu daolu  gaojia) was proposed by the Ministry of Transporta-
tion (Ṍ忂悐, Jiaotong bu) in 1996. One year later, in 1997, it obtained the 
formal approval of the Executive Yuan (埴㓧昊, Xingzheng yuan). The 
planned highway would have been 12.8 kilometres long, linking the exist-
ing highway network of Taibei City to the northern tip of Taiwan. The 
route would start from Beitou, proceed toward the Guandu Bridge, cross 
over the metro line, and continue along the Danshui River, passing 
through areas of natural beauty such as mangrove forests (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: A View of the Future Site of the Danshui North Shore Road Project 
Seen from Danshui 
Source: © Simona Grano, 17 September 2011. 
Shortly following the project’s approval by the Executive Yuan, some 
civil society groups joined forces and set up an organization called the 
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National Alliance for the Rescue of the Danshui River (ޘ≁ᣒᮁ␑≤⋣
㹼ࣘ㚄ⴏ, Quanmin qiangjiu danshuihe xingdong lianmeng) in order to fight 
the Executive Yuan’s decision. In voicing their objections, they demand-
ed that a formal EIA be carried out. In 2000 the Environmental Protec-
tion Administration (EPA, ⧟؍㖢, Huanbaoshu), created in August 1987, 
conducted its first EIA on the project. At the conclusion of the EIA, the 
EPA stopped the construction of the road, considering it too damaging 
to the local ecosystem. 
Surface Road along the North Shore of the Danshui River (on 
the Riverbed) 
The third alternative, to build a surface road on the north shore of the 
river (␑≤⋣ेڤᒣ䶒䚃䐟, Danshuihe beice pingmian daolu) on the path of 
the actual riverbed (⋣ᐍ㹼≤४, hechuan xingshuiqu), was put forward by 
the Taibei County government, but due to the various restrictions of the 
Water Resources Law (≤࡙⌅, Shuili fa) this project was discarded in the 
early planning phase. For the sake of clarity, a surface road is a standard 
road that runs at ground level. The term is usually employed to differen-
tiate a particular road from a highway in that it usually runs more slowly, 
as it has many traffic lights. 
Surface Road along the North Shore of the Danshui River 
(2006–present)
To avoid the above-mentioned problem, the Water Resources Bureau  
(≤࡙㖢, Shuili shu) of Taibei County later suggested building the ex-
pressway along the river (not over it) so as not to violate the Water Re-
sources Law. This fourth proposal, “Surface Road along the North 
Shore of the Danshui River”, is the one that best embodies the divergent 
interests of the various agents involved in the controversy: two local 
governments – Taibei City and Taibei County, the latter of which has 
recently changed its name to New Taibei City (ᯠेᐲ, Xin bei shi); the 
central government with its various bureaus and offices; the local com-
munity; and various social groups.  
The planned road in this fourth project starts from Deng Hui Av-
enue (ⲫ䖹བྷ䚃, Denghui dadao), now called Danjing Road (␑䠁䐟, Dan-
jing lu), and it stretches along the river connecting the mangrove area 
with Zhu Wei Road (ㄩത䐟, Zhuwei lu). It measures 4.7 kilometres in 
length and it is a 20-metre-wide, four-lane road. 
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The Road Saga 
Conflicting Powers 
As mentioned earlier, this last proposal, which was approved by the EIA 
committee in April 2011, best exemplifies the various conflicting inter-
ests of the many parties involved in the controversy. On one side of the 
barricade we find New Taibei City, which includes Danshui Town. On 
the other side we have Taibei City. What are their respective interests? 
Taibei County, hoping to develop the real estate market in Danshui, has 
pushed for the construction of the surface road for many years, while 
Taibei City, afraid of the traffic consequences for the already jammed 
roads, has long been staunchly opposed to it. At the initial stage, Taibei 
County, encouraged by the Ministry of Transportation, sought hard to 
establish regular meetings with Taibei City in order to find a solution to 
the protracted stalemate. In 2006 various monthly meetings were sched-
uled, but Taibei City boycotted every one of them by refusing to send 
equal-level officials to the coordination assemblies (Interview 4). In these 
cases, civil service personnel often create an informal network connect-
ing local officials with their central counterparts in order to facilitate 
coordination; due to its opposition towards the project, however, Taibei 
City did not send anyone to represent the city government at the meet-
ings. Furthermore, at that time the central government was still in the 
hands of the DPP, and between 2007 and 2008 the Minister of Envi-
ronmental Protection was Mr Winston Dang (䲣䟽ؑ, Chen Zhong-xin) 
who viewed the project negatively because of the damage it would cause 
to the mangrove forest (Interview 2).  
Chronology 
One of the main events in the road saga took place in July 2008, when 
the KMT came back into power. Wu Yu-sheng (੣㛢᰷), a Kuomintang 
legislator, convened a meeting to discuss the fourth proposal in detail in 
order to get beyond the impasse. At the initial stage, the open support of 
Wu Yu-sheng offered a guarantee of the project’s political feasibility. He 
invited representatives from the Water Resources Bureau, the Taibei 
County government, the Transportation Bureau of Taibei City, and the 
Ministry of Construction (⠏ᔪ㖢, Yingjian shu) to the aforementioned 
meeting. The talks ended in deadlock due mainly to the opposition of 
Taibei City’s Transportation Bureau; its representatives claimed that the 
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road would mean a massive increase in the flow of people entering the 
city, which would be detrimental to Taibei’s already jammed arteries.  
What proved crucial for the temporary halting of the surface road 
option in the end was a prehistoric site that was discovered on the 
planned route in July of that same year, causing the central government 
to stop work and call in an expert from Taiwan University to evaluate 
the relics (Interview 4). 
In September 2008 a few social groups opposed to the construction 
of the project organized a press conference and started an online petition 
৽␑े䚃䐟䘎㖢, Fan Danbei daolu lianshu) (Petition 2008) broadcasting 
the fact that the consultation with the county government, organized by 
Legislator Wu, did not yield any results. In the months that followed, a 
wide range of civil society groups joined in the collective effort to stop 
the project. The main group was the Danshui Heritage Foundation (㶉
≤᮷ॆส䠁Պ, Danshui wenhua jijinhui), which was founded in 1995 by the 
Danshui municipality government to supervise the area’s numerous cul-
tural relics, and which undertook the action of writing to the EPA to 
remind it that the previous EIA had occurred eight years ago and that, at 
the time it was carried out, it had resulted in a “red light” for the project. 
In reality, the first EIA, conducted in 2000, was directed at the second 
project but since the planned route in the fourth project does not differ 
much from it, except for being shorter, some of the agents involved (e.g. 
the EPA) thought it unnecessary to carry out a second EIA.  
Simultaneously, this same group of NGOs – sometimes collectively 
referred to as the Alliance of Green and Democratic NGOs (㔯㢢≁ѫ⽮
Պ㚄ⴏ, Lüse minzhu shehui lianmeng) – prompted the Control Yuan (ⴁሏ
䲒, Jiancha yuan) to pressure the EPA to renew the EIA while also criti-
cizing the attitude of the Taibei County government. Many of the social 
groups we interviewed have used the word “hoodlum” (⍱≃, liumang) to 
describe construction companies and local governments who, in their 
words, often utilize intimidating and rogue techniques to make them 
desist in their quest to stop the project. While in mainland China green 
NGOs have to be careful not to irritate the government, in Taiwan it is 
private companies and their allies (e.g. local officials) that NGOs have to 
be wary of.  
The first turning point in the Danshui road case came in October 
2008, when the EPA, under pressure from the Alliance, sent a letter to 
the Taibei County Water Resources Bureau requesting a new EIA even 
though the proposed route was almost identical to that from the year 
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2000. Among the different civic organizations comprising the Alliance 
we find: the Green Citizens’ Action Alliance, the Society for the Protec-
tion of Wilderness, and the previously mentioned Danshui Heritage 
Foundation. By forming this alliance, green civil society organizations 
and concerned local residents were able to influence a government organ 
(the EPA) into complying with their requests (conducting a second 
EIA). While a few of these groups were obviously driven by private in-
terests – some local residents were afraid that their properties would lose 
value by being so close to a major highway – most had more altruistic 
motives: Some wished to preserve this area for recreational purposes, 
while others hoped to save the local wildlife and flora. 
The second essential turning point took place in November 2008, 
one month after the EPA ordered a second EIA, when the mayor of 
Danshui Town (㭑ᾝٹ, Cai Ye-wei) petitioned the Control Yuan to 
impeach the director of the EPA, Shen Shi-hong (⊸цᆿ), claiming that 
Shen had violated the EIA Act (⧟ຳᖡ૽䇴ՠ⌅, Huanjing yingxiang pingu 
fa). The grounds for the accusation were that the planned route was in 
fact only 4.7 kilometres long, and thus, according to EIA regulations, did 
not necessitate a new EIA. Cai writes in this petition letter (䱸䇹Җ, 
chensushu) that the EPA had simply caved in to the emotional outbursts 
of “pseudo-environmentalists lacking any basic knowledge of the pro-
ject” (Interviews 9). 
The director of EPA was in fact “temporarily” impeached, and the 
Republic of China’s vice-president, Vincent C. Siew (㮝㩜䮧, Xiao Wan-
zhang), declared in 2009 that the responsibility for planning this project 
should be returned to the Ministry of Transportation. From that mo-
ment on, everything stopped because the different parties could not 
agree on a common solution. At the central level, the EPA and the Min-
istry of Transportation have been increasingly cooperating with one 
another to try to find a common solution as they wait for the results of 
the second EIA. 
Multi-scalar Levels of Governance 
Supporters and Their Motives 
As briefly mentioned earlier, this case is extremely interesting because it 
involves a plethora of different actors with conflicting interests within 
and outside of multiple levels of government, each with their own agen-
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da. Even though the differing positions of the two local governments 
(that of Taibei City and that of Taibei County) have already been empha-
sized, it is necessary to mention that there were different opinions and 
views within the central government itself.  
The Ministry of Transportation was the main organ in favour of ap-
proving the project in the hope that it would ease the difficult traffic 
situation. The EPA, also a central government organ, initially claimed 
that an EIA was not needed since the new project was less than five 
kilometres in length. According to Articles 5 and 6 of the sub-regulations 
of the EIA Act titled Standards for Determining Specific Items and 
Scope of Environmental Impact Assessments for Developmental Activi-
ties, any project that is less than five kilometres in length does not need 
to undergo an EIA. As previously mentioned, under pressure from civil 
society groups, the EPA agreed that a new EIA was nevertheless needed. 
The positions of the local governments are also worth analysing in 
depth: On one side, both the government of Taibei County and that of 
Danshui Town are in favour of the new road and claim that the decision-
making process rests with them since the road would run within Taibei 
County. Thus, the right to build and operate this road (without consult-
ing either the central government or the Taibei City government) is 
theirs. According to Article 11 of the Highway Law (ޜ䐟⌅, Gonglu fa), 
the right to build and operate a road within the territory of a county 
government resides with the latter. Opposed to the road and worried 
that an increased flow of people entering the city would lead to a rise in 
traffic congestion, the Taibei City government said that it would support 
the project only if it passed the second EIA assessment. It has to be 
mentioned that the Taibei–Danshui surface road has long been planned 
as a lynchpin to New Taibei City. Since the very beginning, though, the 
pressure to build and the support for this road has come from New Tai-
bei City and Danshui Town, with Taibei City’s stance on this issue vary-
ing from disinterest to outright opposition, according to a multitude of 
factors, among them: who was in charge of the EPA; who was in charge 
of Taibei City’s Traffic Bureau; and, finally, which party was in charge of 
the central government, blue (KMT) or green (DPP). All of our inform-
ants in the Taibei City government claimed that the city has nothing to 
gain from this road and thus has no interest in supporting it; according 
to them, there is sufficient communication between the two places, and 
an additional road is only going to increase traffic jams in Taibei. 
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What were the real motives of the “pro-growth” coalition aggres-
sively advocating for the road? In fact, behind the scenes, the political 
interests of politicians along with the financial incentives of the business 
community were playing out. According to Mr Wang Chung-ming, 
Green Party candidate for city councillor of Danshui Town and member 
of the Green Party Central Committee, the two interests overlap in this 
case because quite a few of the local politicians also own successful real 
estate and construction companies (Interview 8). In democratic coun-
tries, politicians have to compete for votes. It thus goes without saying 
that the driving force behind certain decisions is often the attempt to 
attract people’s votes (Weller 2006: 150). In the Danshui case, for exam-
ple, some members of the Legislative Yuan were opposed to the con-
struction of the road – a notable example being Tian Qiu-jin (⭠⿻ื), 
DPP legislator – but others, like Legislator Wu Yu-sheng, supported the 
project in order to fulfil the promise he made during the election cam-
paign to relieve traffic congestion in Danshui. During the past three 
years, various organs have tried to coordinate the various actors involved 
so as to facilitate the adoption of a common project. It has to be said, 
though, that those who tried hardest to coordinate and push for the 
construction were also those who would gain the most from the project 
(e.g. Danshui Town and Legislator Wu; Taibei County and its real estate 
sector). Since all of these agents know how to employ and bend the rules 
to their own advantage (especially those connected with the government, 
be it the local or the central), with the present article we have tried to 
clarify which agents were most successful at influencing the decision-
making process and what their key motivations were. In the next section, 
we will discuss and analyse the methods and strategies used by the envi-
ronmentalist camp. 
Opponents and Their Strategies
What was the role of grass-roots organizations in this case? How did 
they impact the decision-making procedure? Ho Ming-sho talks about 
procedural participation when referring to the “institutionalized access 
for environmentalists in the decision-making process” (Ho 2005: 345-
346). He also defines “policy impact” as “the possibility of whether 
movement ideas can be realized through state action” (Ho 2005: 345-
346). In our research we tried to find out whether, in the Danshui case, 
social movements have been able to substantially impact the decision-
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making process even without being granted official participation in state 
echelons. 
Many environmental groups have been involved in this case 
throughout the years; some are still active today and have meanwhile 
devoted their interests to other cases while other, less stable groups dis-
appeared when the immediate threat to them or to their properties 
seemed to be more distant, even if only temporarily (Hsiao 1999). Since 
2006, when the discussion about the fourth project began, a few of the 
more active social groups have decided to join efforts with the local resi-
dents of an area of Danshui Town called Zhu Wei (ㄩത). Being the 
town’s closest area to the mangroves, its residents are those who will lose 
the most once the road is built, and they claim it will ruin their view and 
affect the local environment negatively (Interview 1). It is also worth 
mentioning that apart from Zhu Wei residents, the majority of Danshui 
Town locals are in favour of the construction project, or at least do not 
dare say otherwise openly (Interviews with various local residents, Feb-
ruary–May 2011). 
So what kind of strategies did the social groups use to stop the con-
struction of the road? And how did they get involved in this case in the 
first place?  
In June 2008 a group of Zhu Wei residents called the Green Citi-
zens’ Action Alliance to enlist their help. For the sake of clarity it must 
be explained that the first big wave of protest (ᣇ䇞, kangyi) against this 
project took place from 1997 to 2000. After carrying out the first EIA, 
the EPA ended up halting the project altogether. The second time 
around (from 2006 up to the present), NGOs have lamented the fact 
that local citizens have been much less involved and interested in 
fighting the authorities, although the NGOs have thus far been unclear 
on why people have lost interest in the case (Interview 7). 
As for the second EIA, the Danshui road project has gone through 
three review meetings in the year 2011 alone; during these assemblies, 
civil groups were allowed to express their concerns and present their 
evidence while experts from both sides voiced their opinions and pro-
posed alternative plans. Both sides have the right to call in three experts 
to champion their cause (Interview 3). When we asked Ms Tsui if she 
was invited to these meetings as well, her laconic answer was: “I partici-
pated but I was not invited. Social groups are never welcome because 
government officials fear they might cause embarrassing scenes” (Inter-
view 7). If that is the case, how then do the groups know when the EIA 
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committee is holding its meetings? All social activists interviewed ex-
plained that they devote a huge portion of their time to checking the 
webpage of the committee responsible for the EIA each day to see when 
and where the next assembly is going to be held; a task that proves more 
difficult than one would think, as the committee purposely posts this 
information online less than one week prior to the actual meeting in 
order to try to restrict social groups from participating. 
As for the methods employed by social organizations in this contro-
versy, they range from organized sit-ins in front of the Control Yuan 
with a crowd of 60 to 70 people (in 2008) to systematic street protests, 
generally held the day before the committee plans to meet. Also, prior to 
every EIA assembly, social groups prepare a summary of the case that 
contains the most important facts, and they send it to various media 
outlets to try to get them involved. This has ensured media coverage 
even on short notice, but it has also meant extra work for the environ-
mentalists, who have had to prepare a press release before every protest 
or demonstration in order to get the media interested. This indifference 
on the part of the media changed (though probably only temporarily) in 
the aftermath of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster on 11 
March 2011. In the past few months, the Green Citizens’ Action Alliance 
has been bombarded by telephone calls from journalists interested in 
both the public opinion on “green issues” and what the alliance is doing 
in regards to its other main concern: nuclear power plants. The Green 
Citizens’ Action Alliance devotes its energies to two main issues: fighting 
the construction of nuclear plants on Taiwanese soil, and protecting the 
Danshui area.  
Many social groups believe that, apart from media involvement, the 
most important factor in succeeding in a confrontation with the gov-
ernment is public opinion. All social groups we interviewed have stressed 
that public opinion plays a very important role in Taibei, where the polit-
ical powerhouses have to gain the confidence of the electorate (and 
where land prices are so high that every case involves huge economic 
interests), while it plays a lesser role in other Taiwanese cities (Interview 
6, 7). While print media often report on green campaigns because they 
seek the catastrophist tinge that creates public interest and concern (and 
thus helps to sell more copies), NGOs have to be more creative in their 
dealings with the public. An effective way to keep people’s attention high 
is to organize leisure activities like concerts with famous artists and rock 
stars who perform on behalf of the protection of the Danshui area (a 
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notable example being the NoNuke Street Band, 䈪ࣚᇒ䎠ୡ䱏, Nuo 
nuke zou chang dui), as well as coordinating other outdoor events (Yang 
2011). The latter is a particularly successful strategy: NGOs often organ-
ize biking trips close to the mangrove forests; in this way, they vividly 
convey the effects that the construction of the road would have on people’s 
lives and those of their loved ones. The message is clear: No more lei-
surely Sunday afternoons with children and grandchildren in the nice 
green surroundings of Danshui. If the road gets built, the mangroves will 
be torn away and so will the bike lane! 
Finally, another very effective method activists have employed in 
the Danshui case has been the organization of petitions. In 2008 alone, 
more than 10,000 signatures were collected, the majority of which came 
from non-residents of Danshui. During a follow-up interview on 24 
September 2011, Ms Tsui revealed that 131 social groups (a very con-
spicuous number considering the total number of NGOs devoted to the 
environment in Taiwan) took part in this petition. 
Opponents and Their Allies
Before the final ruling in April, we asked social groups what they thought 
the results of the second EIA would be, and many green activists gave 
the same answer: “There is a 50-50 chance that things will go either way” 
(Interview 6, 7, 8), an answer that conveyed the uncertainty surrounding 
the final outcome previous to the EIA decision. One particularly trouble-
some aspect social groups and other actors belonging to the “opposing 
faction” have highlighted was that even though the Taibei City govern-
ment remains opposed to the construction of the road, its administration 
still belongs to the KMT. Over the past few years, social groups have 
often tried to cooperate with the government of Taibei City because of 
the common position on this project. The Taibei City government, 
though, cannot/ does not publicly express support for NGOs, and if it 
does help by occasionally leaking information on the Taibei County gov-
ernment or the Danshui Town government, it does so secretly. For this 
reason, social groups became more pessimistic in regards to the outcome 
of the second EIA after the presidential election of 2008. Even though 
the DPP government was also interested in doing business at the ex-
pense of the environment, civic groups still think that it was easier to 
find a wedge between the different parties to be used as leverage in their 
favour when they were not all “on the same side” (Interview 7). Now, 
even though the different governmental agencies and parties involved 
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have conflicting interests, they still belong to the KMT and therefore, 
strictly speaking, they are all on the same page, which has made it easier 
for them to cooperate and ultimately find a common solution.  
The preconceived idea that the DPP is the party that has environ-
mental protection at heart dates back to the early years of the party’s 
political life. In the early to mid-1980s, when the authoritarian regime of 
the KMT still ruled the country with an iron fist, one of the first move-
ments to emerge was the environmental one; its members were engaged 
citizens (many of them lawyers and professors), increasingly concerned 
by the government’s utmost disregard for the degradation of public lands 
that its industrial policies were provoking (Arrigo and Puleston 2006: 
165-184). Things changed after the martial law system was lifted, and the 
DPP became an “institutionalized” political party with all that this en-
tails: They suddenly had to balance industrial growth and attracting in-
vestments, on the one hand, with protecting the natural environment, on 
the other (Lyons 2009: 59, 64). The DPP’s change of attitude is best 
exemplified by former President Chen Shui-bian’s behaviour throughout 
the years. At his inaugural speech in 2000, the first thing he did was to 
announce his grandiose plan to turn Taiwan into a “green silicon island” 
(㔯㢢⸭ዋ, Lüse xidao) (Williams and Chang 2008); barely one year later, 
at the Economic Development Advisory Conference held in August 
2001, faced with the many financial and industrial difficulties of the 
country, he went so far as to claim that the EIA was a “roadblock to 
economic development and that he would like to ‘kneel down’ to the 
EIA reviewers on behalf of business” (as quoted in Ho 2005: 350). 
Thus, the only viable option for cooperation between environmen-
talists and politicians seems to be the Green Party. In Danshui, Green 
Citizens’ Action Alliance cooperates closely with Wang Chung-ming (⦻
䩈䣈), a local resident who stood for city councillor in Danshui Town in 
2010 representing the Green Party. Social groups emphasize that he 
obtained 7,098 electronic votes (Tsui 2009) despite his firm opposition 
to the construction project (the majority of the local people are in favour 
of it). Since his candidacy did not end up a political debacle, social 
groups regard this as a sign that the number of local residents opposed 
to the road is in fact increasing. As for the Taibei City government 
(which was initially opposed to the road), after the committee’s ruling it 
said that it would comply with the decision, provided that the road 
would stop before entering the city (E-mail exchange with Mr Lan Wei-
gong, 12 July 2011). According to all of our informants in the environ-
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mentalist camp, this type of behaviour seems to be “a somewhat childish 
attempt at not completely ‘losing face’ (я䶒ᆀ, diu mianzi) while being 
forced into complying with the EIA committee’s decision” (Interview 3, 
5, 6, 7, 8). 
Final Stages 
The Second EIA Ends 
The case against the road was formally terminated on 15 April 2011 
when the third EIA review meeting ruled that the Danshui North Shore 
Road Project could proceed. The experts responsible for the EIA named 
a few conditions that New Taibei City has to fulfil before starting con-
struction. The first condition is that New Taibei City shall carry out a 
study on how to best conserve local cultural and ecological properties. 
Second, the city shall organize a workshop for the ecological supervision 
of the area; this workshop has to include at least 12 members recruited in 
equal proportion from among state officials, NGOs, and the academic 
community (Central News Agency 2011). It is the general opinion of 
numerous activists interviewed for our study that “this behaviour is a 
mere façade” and that the EIA committee seeks “to stifle criticism from 
the environmental community” (Interview 7, 8 among others). Under the 
current structure, with six members recruited among pro-KMT profes-
sors and experts, environmentalists claim that it happens quite frequently 
that the committee will lean toward the approval of controversial devel-
opmental projects (Informal chat with Professor Winston Dang, 21 Au-
gust 2011). 
Neither social groups nor the Green Party participated in the last 
EIA meeting but they knew that the committee was going to meet on 15 
April. For this reason, they called a press conference the day before to 
give visibility to the Danshui road saga once again, hoping that this 
would somehow influence the EIA committee’s decision. As Mr Wang 
Chung-ming put it: “We thought that the committee responsible for the 
EIA would behave reasonably” (Interview 8, 29 June); what he meant 
was that the government could not legally proceed, as its actions are in 
violation of the Environmental Protection Law. Strictly speaking, 
though, his claim is incorrect as the law states that if the road is shorter 
than five kilometres (here the road would measure 4.7 kilometres), con-
struction can go ahead without even being subjected to an EIA, which 
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ironically in this case was mandated anyway after social groups exerted 
pressure on the EPA. Furthermore, those in favour of the road maintain 
that it will have no effect whatsoever on the mangroves since no portion 
of the forest will have to be removed as the road will simply pass over it. 
Social groups refute this explanation and claim that flora and fauna will 
still be affected by being in such close proximity to a highway. Because 
social groups know that their leverage in cases like this (involving many 
powerful agents) is quite limited, one of the main strategies they employ 
is to postpone the approval of the case. While gaining more time, they 
try to turn public opinion on environmental issues by organizing numer-
ous press conferences in order to put pressure on the members of the 
EIA committee. 
The Next Step 
Even though the EIA committee’s decision did not surprise those social 
groups and residents opposed to the road, the speed at which permission 
has been granted is somewhat puzzling. On 4 May 2011 we asked Mr 
Wang Chung-Ming (the above-mentioned Green Party representative) 
and Mr Chen – a resident of Zhu Wei nicknamed “Chocolate Daddy”  
(ᐗݻ࣋⡨⡨, Qiaokeli baba) – what they planned to do next. Mr Chen is a 
well-known figure in Zhu Wei both for his political activism in the 
Danshui road case and because he owns a stall where he makes choco-
late waffles, hence his nickname. For security reasons, he does not want 
us to use his real name, so we will use the pseudonym “Chen Fang-bin”. 
At first, in May 2011, aggrieved social groups and local residents 
planned to sue the New Taibei City government; they claimed that one 
portion of the planned road, close to the mangrove area, slightly invades 
the boundaries set for the protection of the forest, thus violating both 
the Cultural Property Law (᮷䍴⌅, Wenzi fa) and the Environmental 
Protection Law (⧟ຳ؍ᣔ⌅ , Huanjing baohu fa) and endangering the 
delicate ecosystem. New Taibei City does not seem to be too concerned 
about the plan to sue, and even retorted that social groups are wrong and 
that they simply use a different kind of measuring system, when in reali-
ty, according to the county’s own calculations, the planned road was 
never to cross the forest. The plan to take legal action was abandoned in 
July because it would require too much effort and too much money to 
sue the local government (Informal conversation with Green Party 
members such as Wang Chung-Ming and Lai Fenlan, 3 July 2011). Thus 
green activists are planning a variety of alternative activities, such as stag-
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ing a protest in front of the Control Yuan to challenge the committee’s 
decision, and organizing a protest demonstration in Danshui; only one 
week after the committee gave the project a green light, thousands of 
posters and leaflets of protest had already been printed (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Posters of Protest against the Danshui North Shore Road Project   
Source: © Simona Grano, 4 May 2011. 
Even though the actual construction is scheduled to begin quite soon 
and a construction site has been set up since October 2011, social 
movements still have not lost hope, and they seize every opportunity to 
emphasize their opposition. On 17 September, on the occasion of a “No 
Car Day” celebration (see Figure 3) organized by the local Danshui 
Town government to boost its image as an “eco-friendly touristic” ad-
ministration, green groups, local activists and green politicians organized 
a counter-protest (see Figure 4) to emphasize the paradox and absurdity 
of a “No Car Day” when, upon completion of the project, the traffic 
flow will in fact be much worse than it is today. 
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Figure 3: “No Car Day” Event in Danshui 
Source: © Simona Grano, 17 September 2011. 
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Figure 4: Protest of the “No Car Day” Event  
Source: © Simona Grano, 17 September 2011. 
According to Mr Chen, many people in Danshui are actually opposed to 
the construction of the road but do not dare to say it out aloud due to 
the widespread connection between local political factions (ൠᯩ⍮㌫, 
difang paixi), construction companies, and real estate developers.  
Social groups hinted that especially in Danshui (although this is also 
true for many other places in Taiwan), the alliance between business and 
political elites dominates local politics. A particularly strong claim made 
by Mr Chen is that many Danshui officials have their own real estate and 
construction companies and thus have a vested interest in this road be-
ing built. One Green Party representative even went so far as to say that 
local mafia (in collusion with construction companies) stages most of the 
traffic congestion problem on Route 2 in order to give people the idea 
that the road is insufficient to cater for the mounting flow of traffic. He 
claimed that every time he goes in loco to check on the traffic situation, 
there is some staged problem like a broken light or a temporary blockage 
set up in order to slow down the traffic. The fact that there are no work-
ers actually repairing the alleged problems has led people to suspect that 
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it may all be a ploy to garner popular support for an alternative road. 
When we went along with Green Party representatives to check on an 
“electrical problem” with a traffic light, we were quickly shooed away by 
a bunch of workers who, previous to our arrival, seemed to be very en-
grossed in a card game rather than in fixing the problem (20 March 
2011).  
Conclusions 
Through the analysis of the Danshui North Shore Road Project case, we 
have tried to show how, even though at the central level environmental 
regulations are clearly formulated, at the local level a plethora of agents 
(from local governments to social groups) have many different ways of 
manipulating and stalling the execution of these regulations. Taiwan 
needs to create new mechanisms that legitimate the participation of all 
concerned stakeholders in the process of implementation in order to 
strengthen agency–constituency communication channels in environ-
mental management. At the same time, though, policymakers should 
avoid creating a situation in which having these multiple stakeholders 
leads to a paralysis of the decision-making process due to lack of clarity 
on who the ultimate authority is for these various interconnected sectors. 
Sustainable development requires public participation coupled with polit-
ical, institutional and administrative capabilities to achieve effective poli-
cies. On the one hand, empowering the public by giving it more institu-
tional channels to vent its discontent through policy mechanisms can 
advance democratic governance and prevent the embarrassing street 
protests that have often occurred in Taiwan. On the other hand, too 
many actors can actually further complicate the situation and hinder 
effective management and implementation of laws. In this particular 
case, various social interests pull the government in many different direc-
tions, as the gap between environmental interests and local interests 
grows wider.  
In the Danshui road case, a vertical power hierarchy is clearly visible 
in which local people (from below) try to counter powers from above 
(be it the local or the central government) by using environmental poli-
cies from above (EIA) to aid their cause. In this specific case, though, we 
have also seen other powers at work: the conflicting claims many local 
governments (and their various bureaus) make regarding having authori-
ty over the project, and the interests of both the local people and civil 
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society organizations in protecting the mangrove areas and or/ their 
personal stake.  
In popularly elected legislatures, these various departments have a 
common interest: attracting votes. It was therefore not difficult to pre-
dict that in the end, the outcome of the EIA review would satisfy the 
interests of the people of Danshui and push forward the development of 
the transportation system. Contrary to what happened in the Hsiangshan 
Tidal Flat Development Project in Hsinchu (ᯠㄩᐲ, Xinzhu Shi) – in 
which social groups, making use of the available legal channels, success-
fully managed to hinder the construction of a project damaging to the 
local ecosystem (Tang 2003) – in the Danshui case, it seems that a scien-
tifically based discussion among scholars, academics and other experts 
has in fact led to an official green lighting of the project. One thing is 
clear from our analysis: Even though at a first glance it seems that formal 
tools (in this case, the EIA mechanism) have managed to postpone the 
construction for so long – thus proving that in democratic countries 
NGOs have a chance to influence green policies by operating inside legal 
channels – a closer look the Danshui case reveals that a second EIA was 
made only after repeated requests, street protests and media reports or-
ganized by social groups and Zhu Wei residents. Thus, this case is a per-
fect example of how official governmental action can be prompted by 
unofficial tools (media, public involvement, street protests), the ultimate 
effect of which was to delay the project. This underlines the importance 
of unofficial tools even in democratic regimes such as Taiwan. Neverthe-
less, even though both unofficial strategies (protests in front of various 
governmental bureaus, petitions and media involvement) and official 
strategies (making use of the EIA regulations) were utilized in the 
Danshui North Shore Road Project, our conclusion is that the official 
strategy (requesting a second EIA, thereby postponing the construction) 
certainly proved more effective in delaying the road project. It came as a 
great surprise to the developers that the project could be stopped, even if 
only temporarily, by those civic associations that had never been “politi-
cal” or powerful enough in Danshui before. 
Our initial question regarding who the most effective actors were 
can be answered this way: Even though social actors have played a key 
role in stalling the project, in the end the decisions lay mostly with other, 
more institutional players like local and central governments (and their 
various bureaus: for instance, the Environmental Protection Administra-
tion).  
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Even though there is no debate as to whether the construction pro-
ject violates the law (as previously mentioned, legally this road is in ac-
cordance with EIA regulations as it is shorter than 5 kilometres), this 
case fits our analysis by showing that – its legality notwithstanding – 
social groups still managed to stall the construction for three years 
(2008–11) employing that very same EIA Act, which formally allows the 
construction of said projects! It is possible that the transverse alliance of 
social groups with the Taibei City government aided civic associations in 
delaying for a longer period of time, thereby proving that although envi-
ronmental policies are, for the most part, mandated from the top, at the 
local level their implementation can be bypassed, altered or stalled by 
these various agents. 
As for the research potential of this case, benefits derived from it 
include future prospective comparative analyses between Danshui and 
other localities’ developmental projects in order to further our compre-
hension of local environmental governance dynamics in Taiwan. Gener-
ally speaking, “opposition to” or “promotion of” a certain project de-
pends on the specific details and characteristics of that project and of 
that locality. In this case, the Taibei City government thought the road 
project would negatively impact the traffic situation, and the environ-
mentalists believed that the road would damage the local environment. 
In certain cases, a bureaucracy can experience internal conflicts over 
certain aspects of any given project. For example, in the Danshui road 
project, the central government’s ministries were not all on the same 
page, with some agencies favouring the project – the Ministry of Trans-
portation – and some railing against it – the Environmental Protection 
Administration, whose attitude changed throughout the course of the 
debate. Inherent difficulties in researching a complex topic like the influ-
ence of green NGOs on local developmental politics make some of the 
arguments in this article tentative. Further empirical as well as statistical 
data will be needed to provide more detailed conclusions. At any rate, 
after a detailed analysis our case study suggests that the political process 
in Taiwan is becoming more pluralistic in ways that are not yet sufficient-
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